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                                                              Abstract  
 
The Competition policy and law designed to maintain market behavior by 
preventing anti-competitive practices of undertakings as well as promoting 
fair stable market competition. The Adaptations of the competition system 
now has become a global norm, today, more than 120 jurisdictions have 
competition policy systems and for a variety of reasons it is indeed a very 
remarkable development for all of us. First the application of competition 
law has tremendous economic significance which provides great economic 
benefits in the form of greater productivity and growth, it can assist in 
developing more effective ways to deliver goods and services. The basic 
foundation of the competition law set in European Union through the 
adaptation of the Treaty of Rome (which creates the EU), and significantly 
that treaty has powerful competition policy provisions provided the 
foundation of competition policy in Europe. EU Commission is now the 
toughest and one of the harsh enforcers in the world fighting 
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An effective, suitably implemented competition law and policy is an inevitable 
necessity for any country, as it for Bangladesh. Bangladesh as one of the 
developing countries, significantly suffering from anti-competitive practices as it 
detrimental to its market-based economy and consumer rights. The absence of 
competition policy had led the existence of monopoly, oligopoly in the internal 
market thus consumers and small enterprises are adversely affected. Initiatives 
were taken to develop a competition policy at the 1996 Ministerial Conferences in 
Singapore but abandoned after Doha Meeting. At Doha meeting in 2001, there 
were some dissent among WTO members to adopt competition policies for 
developing countries, as a result, Bangladesh gave its least attention for its 
competition policy. 
This paper examines the anti-competitive practices in Bangladesh, the overview of 
the competition policies and it also answers the question why still institutions and 
enforcement of these laws are ineffective. Furthermore, this article will also 
explore the type of anticompetitive practices in internal market and its harmful 
effect in Bangladesh. 
 
                                                               Introduction  
 
Bangladesh is overpopulated country with a low per capital income. Its poor 
economy reveals some clue to the obsequious humanitarian situation in the 
country. Bangladesh seceded from its union with West Pakistan and became 
independent in 1971. The whole of Pakistan then was a part of India until 1947, 
when the British deceased from the Indian sub-continent after ruling over it for 
approximately 200 years. A democratic environment has been prevailing in 
Bangladesh since 1991. During the post-independence era (1972 to 1980) 
Bangladesh was unstable in terms of both economically and politically.  
Bangladesh, bordering with Myanmar and India, and situated in deltas of large 
rivers flowing from Himalayas, into the Bay of Bengal. It is divided into six 
administrative regions, with the capital being Dhaka.  
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                                                              Economy  
 
After independence, Bangladesh followed a policy of very unbending import 
exchange in its industrialization strategy. Bangladesh has come a long way in 
terms of trade and exchange rate liberalization, through its smooth and flexible 
import procedures; the significant decline of quantitative restrictions; remarkable 
flexibility of trade in many restricted items; and the considerable rationalization 
and reduction of import tariff. 
 
Recently, the country introduced a freely floating exchange rate system. In the 
Cancun meeting of the WTO, Bangladesh abandoned the Singapore issue and had 
all but given up its initiative of pursuing a competition policy and law. Even though 
there is no denial of the fact that both procedures and consumers feel strongly 
that there should be a competitive business environment for their mutual welfare. 
So a competition policy is an inevitable necessity and internal imperative in 
Bangladesh, regardless of the outcome of the negotiation at the WTO. The Policy 
makers and consumers are well aware of this imperative and henceforward, the 
issue of formulating a national competition policy and law still alive in Bangladesh. 
The movement of consumers in Bangladesh very weak and the demand for a 
competition policy and law from their end is not very forceful.2 
 
                             Competition Evolution and Environment in Bangladesh  
 
After 1971, Bangladesh acceded to a policy of very inflexible substitution as its 
industrialization strategy. The government was stubbornly inward-looking and 
isolated that had led many economic barriers such as widespread quantitative 
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restrictions on imports, high import tariffs, foreign exchange rationing and an 
overvalued exchange. These policies were designed to create a domestic industry 
based economy by protecting local firms against foreign competition. 
Traditionally, the interests of the consumers were often ignored and it was used 
to believe that these small industries would grow up and will eventually become 
more efficient that, in long run, dynamic efficiency gains would balance the initial 
welfare loss. The import-substitution was controlled by macroeconomic concerns 
about the balance of payments (BoPo) and fiscal balance. After one decade of 
highly protected trade regime, Bangladesh continued to worsen both the internal 
and external balance situation, and this import-substitution strategy engendered 
distorted incentive structure, undermining the potential for export growth and 
had led an anti-export bias. In the early-1980s, Bangladesh reformed policies for 
stabilization and taken necessary measures for structural adjustment because 
there were pressures from the World Bank and IMF as there was a movement 
against the import-substituting development around the world. As a result, in the 
mid-1980s, Bangladesh had implemented trade policy reforms with inevitable 
consequence for the domestic competition regime. Quantitative restrictions on 
imports were significantly reduced to 40% in all import lines, tariffs were reduced 
from as high as 350 percent to as low as 40%( currently it is around 25%). 
Exchange rate restrictions were liberalized greatly with frequent adjustment in the 
nominal rate.3 
The imposition of discriminatory sales taxes on imports, tariffs, were protecting 
domestic undertakings but with the trade liberalization process, so the measures 
taken by the government greatly reduced the protection enjoyed by domestic 
firms, in the tradable sector of economy and those firms’ monopolistic power 
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                                Policy and Regulatory Framework in Bangladesh  
 
The aims and objectives of competition policies are meant to promote 
competition, enhance consumer welfare, by preventing restrictive agreements or 
concerted practices that distort competition in the market. Competition regimes 
are vital for its development. Moreover, the competition policy is an area of 
regulatory economics that has received the least attention in Bangladesh.  
Bangladesh, when it was separated from Pakistan in 1971, it inherited all their 
laws as the basis of domestic implementation. Only one law was not notified that 
was Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Ordinance 1970(which is the 
present competition law in Pakistan). However, in 2004, Cabinet approved a law 
on protection of consumer rights and it was supposed to be presented for final 
legislation in the Parliament but it did not. This law was emphasizing the 
consumers’ right to obtain goods and services at competitive price, rights to 
information about the quality, quantity, standard and value of the goods and 
services. The overall policy framework of the country still preventing the 
promotion of an efficient and competitive market structure in Bangladesh for the 
following reasons, 
1. The regulatory framework is yet to be developed. Until recently, a 
regulatory commission has been set up for the telecommunications sector 
but it’s still in its infancy and yet to be matured. Through the establishment 
of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) capital market in Bangladesh 
is regulated.  
2. Transparent and fairness recline at the heart of the competition policy, and 
rule of law concerning competition policies must be implemented 
expeditiously. Therefore, an independent, effective and efficient judicial 
system is vital for ensuring and facilitating business environment for 
competition. Bangladeshi Judicial system is slow and incompetent, as a 
result the cost of litigation increased. Currently, Bangladesh’s legal system is 
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burdened with more than 3.3 million cases.4 The judicial system cannot 
ensure property rights and enforce contracts quickly, the competition 
climate thus seriously disrupted, undermining the interest of consumers. 
3. Irrespective of the substantial magnitude of the liberalization and 
deregulation process, the Government does not allow firms to further entry 
to specific industries that fall into the categories of reserved, regulate or 
over-saturated sectors. Under the regime of competition law, no one can 
tell the firms whether any particular sector is over-saturated, under no 
circumstances the government cannot restrict entry into any sector. 
Currently, cooking oil, electric fans, corrugated iron sheets, etc. that are 
considered as sectors that are saturated. Financial institutions openly 
discourage investors to enter into these sectors, and such practices are anti-
competitive and against the spirit of a competitive environment, as the 
Government does not know whether potential entrants could be even more 
productive and technologically better that the existing ones. 
4. There are some sectors such as telecommunications, power generation and 
air transport, that are gradually being opened up to private sector 
participation but in a non-transparent and unpredictable manner, as a 
result it increases business transaction costs and widespread rent seeking 
opportunities as it does not allow the participation of the efficient firms in 




Bangladesh, until 2012, did not have competition law system and policy 
framework but there was the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Ordinances (MRTPO) enacted in 1970 when Bangladesh was a constituent 
part as East Pakistan, under the Government of Pakistan and remains on the 
legislative books. However, neither the government nor the private sector 
has ever attempted to invoke this law. Despite, the prevalence of 
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competition-related problems in Bangladesh has been widely discussed in 
the media, press stories in the daily newspapers over the past few years 
about the existence of anti-competitive practices such as cartels in the 
purchase, distribution and sale of several staple products such as rice, 
sugar, potatoes, and various other food products including fresh vegetables. 
It has been claimed that these cartels may exist in the part due to the 
monopsonistic market power of wholesalers who also provided finance to 
farmers, control truck transportation and provide refrigerated storage 
facilities.6 The press report may have helped to strengthen support for 
reform, and as such highlight the importance of analyzing and publicizing 
the costs of anti-competitive practices. 
The Ministry of Commerce prepared a draft Competition Act 2008 during the 
stakeholder discussion arranged by the Ministry of Commerce in 2008/9, but 
some business representative raised their concern regarding the adaptation of the 
proposed draft competition bill because it was “drawn up by foreign experts”, that 
the bill was a copy of the Indian Competition bill, and that the advisors sought to 
introduce a one size fits all plan, notwithstanding the level of development, legal 
structure or business practices within Bangladesh.7 Another concern raised by the 
stakeholders was that the previous bill ( MRTPO of 1970) never been 
implemented due to the lack of capacity and skilled technical staff to implement 
it, so there were questions how the new law would be implemented effectively? 
What will prevent the new competition authority from using its powers as an 
avenue for further rent seeking by government? Some considered the bill as a 
trick by the government to intimidate businessmen. 
The Bill was based on international best practice, the benefits of the fair 
competition regime and lessons learned from the experience with competition 
law around the world. The level of development does not reduce the need for a 
sound competition framework and law. The existence of anti-competitive 
practices is potentially more serious in a country with a weaker private sector, 
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where one or a few dominant firms can take full control of the market, as a result 
the most vulnerable in this practice are both consumers and small enterprises/ 
other competitors.  
 
                       The most Prevalent Anti-Competitive Practices in Bangladesh  
 
Due to the lack of legal provisions and consumer’s awareness, anti-competitive 
practices rife with the country. Such practices are, Natural Monopolies (e.g. 
distribution of power gas, railway, telephone and other utility services), Mergers 
(e.g. Standard Chartered Grindlays Bank, embassy appointment fees or visa fees 
has to be deposited particularly in this bank), Price fixing (increasing prices 
through collaboration among importers, local manufacturers, suppliers etc.), 
Presence of state-owned inefficient industries (e.g. textile, sugar, nationalized 
commercial banks etc.), Manipulation of supply (e.g. through collaboration 
among importers, local manufacturers, suppliers etc.). Exclusive dealing and tying 
arrangement (e.g. diagnostic services, educational inputs from particular outlets). 
Weak Regulatory Framework (Judicial system cannot guarantee property rights 
e.g. ETV), Bid Rigging (pre-arranged and threat driven), Price Discrimination 
(Dumping and charging different prices for identical products), Bribery and Gifts 
(e.g. bribing tax officials to avoid taxes), Extortion (e.g. sellers extorted by a 
purchasing agent).
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1. Anti-Competitive Practices in Bangladesh  
                                                            Source: BEI (Bangladesh Enterprise Institute) Findings 
 
 
                                  The competition system in Bangladesh  
 
The competition system in Bangladesh has been traditionally weak and fragile. 
Prior to devising of the Competition Act in 2012, there were almost no policies or 
laws were in existence to govern market competition and the conduct of 
undertakings but some Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practice Ordinance did 
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and has never been put to any practical use.8 In consequence, the market has 
always been affected adversely with a number of distortions like market 
syndicates, cartels, abuse of dominant positions, unfair spiraling price hikes and so 
on. As a result, such anti-competitive practices had led to endless sufferings for 
the consumers and crippling overall market efficiency. 
A competition law, therefore, has long been adopted to address all these issues 
and foster fair competition to ensure that the public is offered quality goods and 
services at fair prices and there are no obstacles for undertakings entering into the 
market. In 1996, a draft bill for competition law first proposed and it took sixteen 
years to finally come to fruition.9 
As of 21st June 2012, the Bangladesh parliament passed the Competition Act, 
aimed at ensuring fair and effective competition in business practices. It is hoped 
that the law will improve production and pricing efficiency, benefiting both 
consumers and producers. The new act enacted to ensure a competitive 
marketplace, as it states “the law aims at preventing, controlling or eliminating 
anti-competitive practices relating to collusion, situations of monopoly and 
oligopoly, combinations or abuse of dominant positions”.  A summary of the main 
provision under the law as follows:   
 
Section 15(1) of the Act, outlawing anti-competitive agreement: No person shall 
enter into any agreement/understanding/collusion, directly or indirectly, 
regarding the production, supply, distribution, storage, or acquisition of products, 
which may cause an adverse effect on competition or result in monopoly or 
oligopoly.  An agreement shall be considered anticompetitive if it directly or 
indirectly:   
1. Determines purchase or sale prices  
2. Results in bid rigging or collusive bidding  
3.  Limits or controls production, supply, markets, technical development, etc. 
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Section 15 (2) of the Act, outlawing abuse of dominant position: No enterprise 
shall abuse its dominant position in the market. The following would qualify as an 
abuse of dominant position:  
1. Direct or indirect imposition of unfair or discriminatory prices or purchase 
conditions.  
2. Limitation or restriction of production of goods and technical or scientific 
developments. 
3. Denial of market access.  
4. Imposition of acceptance of supplementary obligations at the time of 
purchase.  
5. Use of power to enter into or protect other relevant market(s). 
 
The Section 5 of the Act mandates the creation of a Bangladesh 
Competition Commission (BCC), which is responsible for implementing of 
competition law and scrutinizing behavior of the undertakings competing 
within the market. The Commission will be comprising by a chairperson and 
a maximum of four members, its main functions including: 
 
1. Supervising the market and taking necessary measures against 
unscrupulous businesses and organizations.  
2. Conducting inquiries -- upon receiving a complaint or on its own -- into 
anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant positions, collusive 
practices, etc.  
3. Framing rules, policies, and administrative orders relating to competition 
and advising and assisting the government in their implementation.  
4. Passing interim orders upon preliminary determination of anti-
competitive behavior and final orders upon conclusive determination.  
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Final orders might include:  Refraining from the anti-competitive 
behavior, Monetary penalty and Division of enterprises. 
 
Violation of any order of the Commission will be an offence entailing a jail 
term of one year or a fine of Tk 100,000 per day for every day of violation. 
 
 
Does the Competition Act 2012 raise any concern regarding its 
effectiveness and enforcement? 
 
After having passed the competition law and creating mechanism to ensure 
its implementation and the establishment of the Bangladesh Competition 
Commission, there are still concern can be raised over its practical 
execution and potential effectiveness. The problems have been identified in 
regard to this as follows:  
 
Absence of Clarity: Perhaps reasonably, the law is not able to clearly specify 
the precise line beyond which an agreement would become anti-
competitive or an action of dominant position. 
 
Time lag in the establishment of the Commission: It seems intuitively 
obvious that, the Act will not come into effect until the Commission is 
established, and there were many instances in the past, shows that such 
regulatory commissions take a long time to form, stretching from a few 
months to a couple of years. 
 
Lack of Knowledge: The information about the market behavior and anti-
competitive practices is inadequate, because there were very limited works 
have been done and no research/published materials are available educate 
the people. People still haven’t acquired sufficient knowledge about their 
rights as consumers and most importantly the existence of the Competition 
law in Bangladesh thus remains hindered.  
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Confidence: In order to work effectively, the Commission needs to 
overcome the common perception of regulatory authorities as believed to 
be slow, inefficient, and open to influence. Due to lack of confident, the 
people are less likely to lodge a complaint unless they are satisfied of the 
standards of the Commission. In a recent panel discussion on the potential 
implementation problems, a businessman cited an example, he says the 
businessmen are aware of the tax ombudsman but they do not go there due 
to a lack of confidence in the office.10 
 
Abusing the Act: Similarly, past experiences prove that regulatory bodies 
are often vulnerable to political and economic influences. There is a fear 
that the Act can be misused. 
 
Overlapping functions and conflict of interests: The secretary general of 
Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) said, there are always some 
uncertainties in countries with multiple regulatory authorities.11 For an 
example, he said the Commission’s functions my overlap with that of the 
power and energy regulatory commission or the telecom commission, 
potentially leading to conflicts over jurisdiction or turf wars. 
 
There are more developing neighboring countries that Bangladesh can draw 
and learn from, said Mitra and Mehta it their article.12 
 
India: India passed Competition law in 2002 replacing its outdated 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, which penalized market 
dominance irrespective of whether the cause was unfair practices or 
superior efficiency. In 2002, legislation amended and resolve this problem 
by focusing on the abuse of such dominances, which was followed by 
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Bangladesh afterwards. Unfortunately, however, the competition 
commission established by the 2002 Act in India, was poorly–staffed and 
insufficiently equipped. In consequence, in 2007, Act 2002 was amended as 
it was necessary to give the agency more power. 
 
Pakistan: The Competition Commission is more efficient and successfully 
proved its neutrality and demonstrating political independence. For 
example, in spite of being a state-owned company, Pakistan Steel Mills was 
fined by the commission 25 million for abusing its dominant position in the 
low carbon market. 
 
Mauritius: The Competition Commission of Mauritius (CCM) praised for its 
strategic selection of cases and for its transparency in presenting the details 
of its investigative actions. 
 
Egypt: The Egyptian Competition Agency (ECA) recognized for its strong 
internal team of experts and for the ties it had built to the business 
community. The agency was successful and was able to operate effectively 
with the cooperation of the highest level of Egyptian government. 
 
 
                                                              Conclusion  
 
Until today, about 120 countries around the world have competition law systems 
and many observers feel that it is now an inevitable necessity for Bangladesh to 
follow suit, especially given the country’s infamous record of anti-competitive 
cartels, hoarding, black marketing of commodities, and other anti-competitive 
practices. However, implementation and execution of law have always been 
challenging for Bangladesh and if this trend continues, the market will remain 
unstable, small enterprises and potential new entrants will encounter obstacles 
and threats in entering into the market, thus the competition of the market will be 
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distorted. In addition, the basic rights of consumers and an absence of fair 
competition will become detrimental for both the economy and consumers.  
Irrespective of the reforms and the establishment of the commission, Bangladesh 
is still possessing weak competition regime, which hindered the efficiency gains, 
and as a weak competition regime the interest of consumers is totally ignored. For 
Bangladesh, setting up an effective regime would be challenging and for this it 
would require, legal and regulatory reforms, implementation of rule of law, an 
independent Judicial system, and the  development of civil society group is an 
inevitable necessity in protecting the consumers’ interest, as they have an 
important role to play in raising consciousness , regarding vices of anticompetitive 
practices, education, media and social organization have a role to play in 
mobilizing a society for an appropriate competitive regime, and most importantly 
further deregulation and liberalization of the domestic economy. 
Furthermore, competition policy is not a solution for promoting competitiveness, 
there are some other requirements as well, such as human capital, institutional 
infrastructure, ethical business codes and commitment to good governance. It is 
now, obvious that a competition act can be crucial for effective competitive 
constraints, can be a useful tool for fostering health competition, but it is 
unquestionably depending on a strong, neutral, transparent, skilled and 
committed oversight commission.  
 
